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Abstract
The game theoretic prediction for alternating offer bargaining depends
crucially on how “the pie” changes over time, and whether the proposer in
a given round has ultimatum power. We study experimentally eight such
bargaining games. Each game is once repeated before moving on to the
next one what defines a cycle of altogether 16 successive plays. Participants
play three such cycles. There are no major experience effects but strong
and reliable effects of anticipated rule changes. The latter, however, are not
due to strategic considerations but rather to the social norms of fairness
and efficiency.
∗We thank Dorothea Kübler and Claude Montmarquette for helpful comments.
†Humboldt-University of Berlin, Department of Economics, Institute for Economic Theory
III, Spandauer Str. 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany
‡Groupe d’ Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), UMR 5328 du CNRS, 93, Chemin
des Mouilles, 69130 Ecully, France and CIRANO, 2020 rue University, 25ème étage, Montréal
(Québec) H3A 2A5, Canada; marchann@cirano.umontreal.ca
1. Introduction
Alternating offer bargaining is a familiar topic in experimental economics. Start-
ing with Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1985) the late eighties experienced a vivid
debate whether and how actual bargaining behavior differs from game theoretic
predictions (see Güth, 1995, and Roth, 1995, for surveys). Almost invariantly
these studies assume a “shrinking pie”, i.e. that delaying an agreement is costly.
What was varied more systematically was the time horizon T , i.e. the last pe-
riod for reaching an agreement, varying from T = 1 (Güth et al., 1982), T = 2
(Binmore et al., 1985, Güth and Tietz, 1986, Ochs and Roth, 1989), T = 3 (Ochs
and Roth, 1989), T = 5 (Neelin et al., 1988) to “T = ∞”, i.e. to not specifying
explicitly a final period T (Weg, Rapoport, and Felsenthal, 1990) as suggested by
Rubinstein (1982). One major result of these studies is that only for T = 1 and
T = 2 the implications of backward induction are obvious even when this does
not always imply the corresponding behavior. For T > 3, strategic considerations
are more of the forward induction type1. Since the influence of the time horizon
T has already been thoroughly explored, our experiment always relies on T = 3.
The fact that parties alternate in proposing an agreement does not necessarily
imply that bargaining has to end in the last period T if no earlier agreement is
reached. If there is commitment power at all (what is implicitly assumed by all
bargaining models), it seems feasible that one always can declare one’s offer to
be final, i.e. has ultimatum power (Güth, Ockenfels, and Wendel, 1993). In our
experiment participants confront both situations, those where each proposer has
ultimatum power and those where bargaining can stop early only by an early
agreement.
Over time the “pie”, i.e. what can be distributed among the parties, can either
decrease or increase. Whereas a shrinking pie reflects the well-known costs of
delaying an agreement like waste of time, starting too late cooperating etc., an
1One such argument is, for instance, to demand the difference between the 1st and 2nd round
pie in round 1 if this yields more than 50 % of the 1st round pie.
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increasing pie can be justified by the fact that later agreements are often more
adequate, e.g. by being based on more information, superior incentives etc. Here
we do not only rely on monotonic developments but explore also a “hill” (the
“pie” is largest in period 2) and a “valley” (the “pie” is lowest in period 2).
A vector (p1, p2, p3) of pies pt in periods t = 1, 2, 3 is numerically specified for
each of the four (the two monotonic and the two non-monotonic) different “pie”-
developments.
Each of the four vectors (p1, p2, p3) is played first twice with and then twice with-
out ultimatum power. Thus participants first learn to play a usual alternating
offer game before commanding ultimatum power already in the earlier periods
(t = 1 and t = 2). We refer to the altogether 16 games (4 vectors (p1, p2, p3)× 4
successive plays) as a cycle. Participants play three such cycles, i.e. altogether 48
bargaining games.
How behavior is influenced by past results is intensively studied, both theoreti-
cally (in evolutionary game theory and economics) and experimentally (see Roth
and Erev,1995, for a selective overview). By letting participants play many times
the same simple or more complex (e.g. Huck, Normann, and Oechsler, 1999) game
one observes how behavior adapts to previous experiences in an otherwise con-
stant environment. Here we also study such “behavioral adaptation” but restrict
experiences with the same game to 6 plays and with the same vector (p1, p2, p3)
to 12 plays.
Contrary to many theoretical models of behavioral adaptation (see Weibull, 1995,
for a survey) boundedly rational decision making is influenced by past experiences
(the shadow of the past) and by deliberating the likely consequences of the various
choice alternatives (the shadow of the future). Especially boundedly rational
decision makers should deliberately react to a changing environment, represented
by switching from one of the 8 games to another. “Robust learning experiments”
(see Güth, 2000, for a comparison with other studies) do not study behavior in one
game but in a variety of related games. The idea is to collect evidence for learning
(in the sense of improving behavioral parameters in the light of past experiences)
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and for cognitive adjustments when confronting a new situation. In the light of
such evidence one hopefully can try to model how learning and forward looking
deliberation interact in a process of boundedly rational decision emergence. Unlike
perfect rationality bounded rationality should not be based on abstract axioms
but rather on sound empirical facts. The latter can be provided by explorative
and hypotheses testing (robust learning) experiments.
With this background in mind we can summarize the main intentions of our
experimental study:
• Wewant to establish (stylized) facts and a data basis illustrating how bound-
edly rational negotiators learn from previous experiences with the same or
a closely related bargaining game.
• We want to demonstrate that the likely consequences of bargaining behavior
are anticipated but not in a perfectly rational way, as suggested by backward
induction, but rather in a norm-guided way.
• If the largest “pie” requires to delay an agreement, efficiency (in the sense
of reaching an agreement when the pie is largest) requires a lot of trust that
one will not be exploited. Our experimental data should reveal whether
the fear of being exploited questions efficiency and whether such a fear is
justified.
Our results are straightforward: Participants mostly reach an agreement when
the pie is largest and they share this pie rather equally (slightly favoring the
proposer in this period). Especially in case of universal ultimatum power this often
contradicts game theory. Partly unfair offers are used to discourage inefficient
agreements. Regarding the first two aspects this shows, that learning is of no
or little importance and that, in simple environments like ours, norm guided
deliberation is crucial.
In the following section 2 we first introduce the 8 games and their benchmark
solutions. Section 3 is devoted to details of the experimental procedure. Section 4
describes the main results and section 5 statistically corroborates our main results.
Section 6 concludes.
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2. The game variety
Two bargaining parties, players 1 and 2, alternate in proposing an agreement
which the other can then accept or reject. Acceptance ends the game with the
proposed payoff distribution, a vector (u1, u2) with pt ≥ u1, u2 ≥ 0 and u1+u2 = pt
where the pie pt is what can be distributed in period t = 1, 2, 3. If t < T and the
offer pt − dt to the other party (dt is what the proposer demands for himself) is
not an ultimatum, rejection leads to period t+1 where now pt+1 can be allocated
by the rejecting party. If t = T or if, for t < T , the offer pt − dt is an ultimatum,
rejection implies conflict with each party receiving 0-payoff. Acceptance, of course,
implies that the proposer receives dt and the responder pt − dt. In period
t = 1: player 1 chooses d1, i.e. 1 proposes, 2 responds,
t = 2: player 2 chooses d2, i.e. 2 proposes, 1 responds,
t = 3: player 1 chooses d3, i.e. 1 proposes, 2 responds.
If one disregards different individual time preferences as, for instance, studied
by Ochs and Roth (1989) the “pie”-development for T = 3 can be described by
the vector (p1, p2, p3) of “pies” pt specifying in German Mark (DM) what can be
distributed in period t = 1, 2, 3. We rely on the four vectors (p1, p2, p3) listed in
Table II.1.
p1 p2 p3 nickname symbol
30 20 10 decline D
10 20 30 increase I
10 25 10 hill H
25 10 25 valley V
Table II.1: The four “pie”-developments
Each of the four vectors D, I, H and V can be played with proposers having
ultimatum power, the games Dy, Iy, Hy, and V y, or not, the games Dn, In, Hn,
and V n. For each of the 4 vectorsD, I, H, and V (the 4 rows in Table II.2) the left
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column of Table II.2 describes the solution demands (d∗1, d
∗
2, d
∗
3) and their payoff
implications u∗1 and u
∗
2 for player 1 and 2 when only integer offers are possible and
an indifferent responder always rejects. If ultimatum power is available, it will
always be used, i.e. each proposal d∗t for t = 1, 2, 3 and the games D
y, Iy, Hy,
and V y is an ultimatum. Thus with ultimatum power bargaining always stops in
period t = 1 whereas this is true only for D if no ultimatum power is available.
The period t∗ in which the agreement is reached2 is indicated in Table II.2 by fat
demands d∗t . Whereas in the n-games D
n, In, Hn, and V n the outcome is always
efficient in the sense that u∗1 and u∗2 add up to the maximal “pie”, this is only true
for the y-games Dy and V y when p1 is largest.
ultimatum power
(p1, p2, p3)-type n(o) y(es)
d∗1 d
∗
2 d
∗
3 u
∗
1 u
∗
2 d
∗
1 d
∗
2 d
∗
3 u
∗
1 u
∗
2
D = (30, 20, 10) 19 10 9 19 11 29 19 9 29 1
I = (10, 20, 30) 10 20 29 29 1 9 19 29 9 1
H = (10, 25, 10) 10 15 9 10 15 9 24 9 9 1
V = (25, 10, 25) 24 10 24 24 1 24 9 24 24 1
Table II.2: The solution demands d∗1, d
∗
2, d
∗
3 and payoffs u∗1, u∗2 for the 8 different
games Dy, Iy, Hy, V y, respectively Dn, In, Hn, V n
3. Experimental procedure
The computerized experiment involved 6 sessions, 5 with 12 participants and 1
with 10. Participants, mostly students of economics or business administration
of Humboldt University−Berlin, were invited by leaflets to register for the ex-
periment. They were seated at visually isolated terminals where they found the
written instructions (see Appendix A for an English translation). After read-
ing them carefully participants could privately ask for clarifications. Then the
experiment started with the first cycle.
2The agreement period t∗ for game V n where player 1 can achieve the same agreement in
period 1 and 3 is left ambiguous in spite of our requirements (according to our assumptions
player 2 should reject the first offer and accept the second one in period t = 3 where acceptance
is the only best reply).
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A cycle consists of two plays of Dn , followed by two plays of Dy, and continuing
with this pattern for the vector I,H, and V with four plays each. This cycle
of altogether 16 rounds was twice repeated. After each round participants were
randomly rematched without switching roles (of player 1, respectively 2). Thus a
participant usually confronted 6 different partners in an irregular fashion. Average
earnings are DM 32.9 including the DM 5,−show up-fee. A session needed about
110 minutes (30 minutes for reading the instructions and answering questions).
More detailed information about monetary payoffs is contained in Table IV.1
where earnings are separated according to role (player 1 and 2), game type and
cycle.
4. Results
One coarse way of searching for experience effects is to compare the average rela-
tive (to the maximal pie) earnings of both players for the three cycles (see Table
IV.1 which distinguishes by roles, 1 or 2, cycle (1st, 2nd, 3rd), pie vector (D, I,H, V,
all) and n(o) or y(es)−ultimatum power). Relative earnings are surprisingly con-
stant over the three cycles when proposers command no ultimatum power. We
only found significant differences in the y−games’ relative earnings between cy-
cles.3 When comparing relative earning variations in and between cycles, we found
significant increases only for the Decline pie-development with ultimatum power
(between the 1st cycle (rounds 3 and 4) and the 3rd cycle (rounds 35 and 36) and
between these two cycles p = .0008, Binomial test, one-tailed, for all tests).
For the n−games the distribution of relative earnings in the 3rd cycle is not signif-
icantly different from those in cycles 1 and 2 with p = .479 for player 1 (Wilcoxon
Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test, one-tailed), resp. p = .479 for player 2. For
the y−games one obtains significant differences with p = .0001 and p = .0001 for
player 1, resp. 2. This suggests
3Statistically one compares for i = 1, 2 the differences in average relative (to the maximal
pie) earnings between cycles separately for each of the 4 games (with ultimatum power). These
test results are, of course, questionable since they assume independence in spite of repeated
interaction.
6
Table IV.1: Average earnings as shares of max{p1, p2, p3} separated by game
type, role and cycle.
Observation 1: Only in the more complex y−games one has to learn how to
reach efficient agreements.
Average earnings are affected by
• the conflict rate
• the period of reaching an agreement
• the payoff distribution which is accepted.
The first aspect is illuminated by Table IV.2 listing the agreement, respectively
conflict ratios as well as their absolute numbers (for the three cycles) separately
for the n(o) and the y(es)−games and the periods t = 1, 2, 3. Most agreements
occurred when the periodic pie is largest, (in case of ”V (alley)” this applies to the
1st and 3rd period). Remember that game theory excludes conflict and predicts
agreement for games with the largest periodic pie except for the games Iy and Hy
(see Table II.2). The agreement ratios in Table IV.2 thus imply
7
Observation 2: Agreement is mostly achieved when the pie is largest what
partly (for games Iy and Hy) rejects game theory.
ultimatum power
N(o) Y (es)
agreement agreement conflict
1 2 3 (agree/con f ) 1 2 3 1 2 3
D .80 .63 .44 .56 .82 .91 - .13 .09 -
(54 ,53,60) (11 ,8,8) (4,2,1) (1 , 7 , 1) (48 ,61 ,63) (7,2,1) (0 ,0 ,0) (15 , 6 , 6) (0 , 1 , 0) (0 , 0, 0)
I 03 .06 .93 .07 .05 .08 .92 .01 .12 .08
(4,1 ,1) (7,4,1) (54,61 ,63) (5, 4 , 5) (5,6,0) (6,3,6) (38,54 ,52) (3,0,0) (10 , 5 , 9) (8 , 2, 3)
H .04 .91 .56 .44 .06 .84 .50 .01 .15 .50
(2,2,4) (62,61 ,61 ) (4,3,3) (2, 4 , 2) (6,4,2) (50,56 ,57) (1 ,0 ,0) (1 ,1 ,1) (12 , 9 , 9) (0 , 0, 1)
V .50 .00 .75 .25 .68 .00 .65 .22 .09 .35
(38 ,34,32) (0,0,0) (23,27 ,30) (9, 9 , 8) (49 ,45,49) (0,0,0) (4 , 6, 12) (11 , 15 , 7) (1 , 2 ,0) (5, 2, 2)
Table IV.2: Conditional probability of reaching an agreement or conflict (only for
ultimatum power) in period t (total number of 1rst, 2nd, 3rd cycle in brackets).
Participants are, however, not simply efficiency-minded as shown by the non neg-
ligible numbers of conflicts 28 for Dy, 40 for Iy, 34 for Hy and 45 for V y when
proposer have ultimatum power (for no ultimatum power the frequencies of con-
flict are 9 for Dn, 14 for In, 6 for Hn and 26 for V n). Conflicts often, but not
always decrease with experience, as measured by cycle (see conflict frequencies
in brackets, Table IV.2). Unlike to the n−games conflict in y−games can result
earlier or later: Like agreements they result more frequently in period t when pt
is largest, i.e. when one would have expected a fair offer. More specifically, com-
paring the conflict ratios in games Dy and V y (where p1 is largest) with those in
games Iy and Hy yields significant differences (p = .047 Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs
Signed Ranks Test, one-tailed, for Dy versus Iy and p = .023 for V y versus Hy).4
Observation 3: Only for game types Dy and V y when the 1st pie is largest,
conflict occurs most frequently in the 1st period of games with ultimatum
power (for the other y−games conflict is delayed). Without ultimatum
power the pie development V inspires the most conflicts (in all three cycles).
4We only compare those two games whose maximal pie-values are the same.
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Since efficiency of agreements depends only weakly on the level of experience (as
measured by cycle), Table IV.3 provides a fair overview of the efficiency rate
δ = u1 + u2
max{p1, p2, p3}
of agreements for all 8 game types (cases of conflict are excluded). Ultimatum
power of proposers hardly affects efficiency of agreements even in games Iy and
Hy where the game theoretic benchmark solution predicts δ = 1
3
, respectively
δ = 2
5
. Also the differences between pie-dynamics are minor (≤ .07).
The agreed upon distributions usually favor slightly the player who is the proposer
for the largest pie, as revealed by player 1’s payoff shares
s =
u1
u1 + u2
of agreements listed in Table IV.3. Only the pie dynamics “H(ill)” with player
2 as the proposer when the pie is largest yields a share s < .5. If one compares
the s−share in games Hn and Hy with that of the other games, the (negative)
difference is highly significant; similar comparisons between the other games reveal
no significant effects. This is qualitatively in line with the benchmark solution for
Hn (with s∗ = .4). Altogether the results in Table IV.3 suggest
Observation 4: Agreements are nearly always efficient, i.e. reached in periods t
when pt is largest, and favor slightly (by a not more than 5% deviation from
the equal split) the proposer in that period t.
N(o) Y (es)
(δ, s) (δ, s)
D (.93,.52) (.98,.54)
I (.96,.53) (.93,.54)
H (.95,.46) (.96,.45)
V (1,.54) (1,.55)
Table IV.3 : Efficiency and relative payoff distribution δ and s when conflict is
avoided.
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ultimatum power
(p1, p2, p3)-type n(o) y(es)
d1 d2 d3 u1 u2 d1 d2 d3 u1 u2
D = (30, 20, 10) 16.5 11.2 6.7 14 12.8 16.9 9.5 13.8 11.7
I = (10, 20, 30) 8 13.2 16.2 14.3 12.6 8 12.9 16.2 12 10.5
H = (10, 25, 10) 7.3 13.8 5.9 10.3 12.4 7.3 14.4 7 8.8 11.2
V = (25, 10, 25) 14.3 7.0 14 11.9 10 14.1 6.8 13.9 10.8 8.8
Table IV.4: The average demands and payoffs observed for the 8 different games
Dy, Iy, Hy, V y, respectively Dn, In, Hn, V n (fat entries when pt is largest)
Table IV.4 corresponds to Table II.2. The striking difference is that extreme allo-
cations with u∗2 = 1 are completely avoided. For the n−games the actual results
are at least qualitatively in line with the effects, suggested by the benchmark so-
lution.5 In y−games where the benchmark solution always predicts meager offers
(pt − dt = 1) it cannot account at all for the actual behavior. Minor differences
are due to the differences in conflict ratios and in degrees of missing an agreement
when the pie is largest.
According to Table IV.4 the average offers on the way to the period with the
maximal pie can be quite meager: So the average demands d1 in period 1 for the
vector I are with 80% of p1 rather unfair; for period 2 it is with 66% for In and
64.5% for Iy still above the level 54% in period 3 when the pie is maximal. Also
for the vector H the average demand in period 1 is with 73% much higher than
the average demanded share 55.2% (for Hn), resp. 57.6% (for Hy) in period 2
with the largest pie. The average demanded shares d2 for the vector V are slightly
more moderate (70 % for V n, 68% for V y). Also after missing an agreement for
the largest pie (in periods t = 2 and 3 for D and in period t = 3 for H) the offers
are quite generous.
Observation 5: The desire to reach an agreement when the pie is largest is
signaled, respectively induced by meager offers in earlier periods, both in
n−games and in y−games (in the latter games an additional signal is, of
course, not to use ultimatum power).
5That most agreements for V n are reached in period t = 1 only questions the special as-
sumption for the case of indifference.
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This last observation is corroborated by Figure IV.1 which plots the relative offers
at periods t = 1, 2, 3. The bold line links the relative offers made when the pie is
largest (unlike in Table IV.3 here the rejected offers are included). For the largest
pie-periods mean relative offers stay in the narrow interval [.38; .47] whereas the
mean relative offers for given rounds t fluctuate a lot. Participants, who fail to
reach an agreement at the highest pie period (D and H games), propose often
higher relative counter offers in the next period (in 31.25% of the cases).
0,0
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0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46
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Figure IV.1: Average relative offers at period t = 1, 2, 3 and t = max{p1, p2, p3}
over rounds.
The ways in which an agreement can be reached when pt is largest differ for n−
and y−games. In an n−game the proposer in that period t < 3 must suggest an
(by the responder in t) acceptable distribution of pt. In a y−game the proposer
can additionally exclude any further possibility to reach an agreement by declaring
the offer to be final. Do proposers in y−games rely on the same mechanism as in
n−games? Table IV.5 displays the rates (and the absolute numbers) of exercising
one’s ultimatum power separately for t = 1 and t = 2 (in t = 3 every offer is an
ultimatum offer), the four pie-developments, and each cycle. Around 70% of the
offers pt − dt when pt is largest are ultimatum offers. Thus ultimatum power is
not just neglected but consistently used:
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Observation 6: Contrary to game theory ultimatum power is not always exer-
cised but mainly used to encourage acceptance when pt is largest.
Altogether our data suggest that commitment power, here in the sense of ulti-
matum power, is largely overrated by game theory. At least the desire to strive
for fair and efficient agreements seems to be much more influential. The latter
conclusion is supported by Table IV.4 listing average payoffs (with never differ by
more than 2.5, i.e. |u1 − u2| < 2.5).
Mean Nb. of ultimatum
cycle t = 1 t = 2 t = 1 t = 2
1 .70 .33 98 14
D 2 .73 .16 102 6
3 .67 .04 94 2
All .70 .17 294 22
1 .06 .23 8 30
I 2 .00 .11 0 16
3 .00 .17 0 24
All .02 .17 8 70
1 .01 .62 2 86
H 2 .01 .71 2 98
3 .03 .74 4 100
All .02 .69 8 284
1 .59 .03 82 2
V 2 .60 .07 84 4
3 .50 .00 70 0
All .56 .03 236 6
1 .34 .36 190 132
All 2 .34 .33 188 124
3 .30 .32 168 126
Table IV.5 : Termination options (rates and frequencies) chosen at periods
t = 1, 2.
Let S denote the share of pt which has been offered. In general, a low share S
should go along with a high rejection rate. A low offered share S must, however,
not be an attempt to exploit the responder. If pt is not the largest pie, it may be
simply a signal to wait for the larger pie. In Figure IV.6 a and b we illustrate for
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n− and y−games as well as for the largest and non largest pies the frequencies
of rejected offers for different intervals for S, namely 0 ≤ S ≤ .17, .17 < S ≤
.33, .33 < S < .5, .5 ≤ S ≤ .5, .5 < S. Clearly, only for the largest pie-periods the
usual relation between the fairness and acceptability of S holds.
Observation 7: Only in the largest pie period the rejection rate decreases with
the relative share S which has been offered.
Frequencies of rejection in n- games
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Figure IV.6 a
Frequencies of rejection in y-games
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Figure IV. 6 b
5. Further Statistical Analysis
To illustrate how the previous observations are supported by our data, we have
run a linear regression explaining the offer behavior. The offer made to subject i
at period t with i = 1, ..., 70 and t = 1, 2, 3 is estimated by the following equation6:
Oit = γ0 + (γ1 + γ01.TMaxit )PMaxit + γ2Pit.T noMaxit + γ3T ermit + (γ4 + γ04.TMaxit )Ri,t + γ5A
fter
it
The variable PMaxit is the largest pie, i.e. P
Max
it = max{p1it , p2it , p3it}. TMaxit
(T noMaxit ) represents a dummy variable taking value of 1(0) if Pit, the pie for which
6As participants alternate their position of proposer and responder during the round, offer
Oit is made by participants in role 1 at period t = 1 and t = 3 and by participants in role 2 for
t = 2.
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subject i makes an offer at period t, is (not) largest and 0(1) otherwise. T ermi,t is
also a dummy variable with T ermit = 1 for y−games and T ermit = 0 for n−games.
Variable Ri,t indicates the round corresponding to observation Oit. A
fter
it is a
dummy variable with value 1 when period t follows the largest pie period and 0
otherwise. In case of the pie−development D one would have Afterit = 1 for t = 2
and in case of H for t = 3.
To test the significance of Observation 5 that efficient agreement are induced
meager offers in early periods parameter γ1, estimating the influence of PMaxit ,
should be significantly negative and parameter γ01, concerning the combined effect
of PMaxit , be significantly positive. Since Observation 6 claims that the termina-
tion option is not used to exploit but rather to reach an efficient agreement, the
influence of the termination option on offers should be negative but insignificant.
Furthermore, this should not significantly increase the number of conflicts. To
trace learning effects we analyse separately the influence of time Rit on offers
when the pie is largest (γ04TMaxit Rit) and when not (γ4Rit). The low level of learn-
ing in average relative earnings (Observation 1 ) does not exclude learning effect
in offer behavior.7
The regression result is listed in Table V.1. Overall, our model is highly significant
(p − value = .00000 and R2 = .7900) The expected effects due to Observation
5 are significantly confirmed: PMaxi,t has a negative and highly significant overall
effect on offer behavior (γ1 < 0) in the non-maximal pie-periods and increases
significantly offers in the maximal pie-period (γ01 > 0).
Observation 6 is weakly in line with the regression results since ultimatum power
implies only insignificantly smaller offers in y−games (γ3 < 0). Offers increase
significantly over time (γ4 > 0) and decrease only insignificantly when t is the
largest pie period (γ04 > 0). This latter result is in line with Observation 6. In
case of Afterit = 1 participants, who rejected in the largest pie period, make a
counter offer. Their reactions are captured by parameter γ5 which is positive
and significant. Such counter offers are relatively higher to avoid delaying the
agreement even more or not reaching one at all.
7Participants might have learned to increase their offers and to avoid conflict more often so
that on the agregate level earnings remain stable on average.
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Variables B. t− statistic p− value
Constant γ0 −1.081 −2.142 .0322
PMaxi,t γ1 −.0611 −3.004 .0027
PMaxi,t .T
Max
i,t γ01 .5400 57.651 .0000
Pi,t.T
noMax
i,t γ2 .4878 32.506 .0000
T ermi,t γ3 −.0906 −1.110 .2670
Ri,t γ4 .0114 2.603 .0093
Ri,t.T
Max
i,t γ04 −.0059 −1.03 .2990
Afterit γ5 1.841 7.231 .0000
N = 3193(8) p− value = .00000
F (7, 3185) = 1711.75 R2 = .7900
Adjusted R2 = .78955
Table V. 1: Estimation results of the regression.
Acceptance behavior can be similarly explained by a probit regression in which the
dependent variable yit is coded into {0, 1} to estimate the probability of acceptance
(yit = 1) by subject i in period t with t = 1, 2, 3 and i = 1, .., 35 (a rejection is
coded as yit = 0). We denote by Oit the offer to which yit reacts.
yit = α0 + (α1 + α01.TMaxit ).PMaxit + (α2 + α02.TMaxit ).Oi,t + α3T ermit + (α4 + α04.TMaxit )Ri,t + α5A
fter
it
The estimation results, reported in Table V. 2, show that the overall model is
significant. The probability of acceptance increases significantly with the offer
made (α2 > 0) and even more if this is the largest pie period (α02 > 0). The
highly significant and negative parameter α01 reveals that the overall probability
of conflict is larger in the largest pie period: Participants are not simply efficiency
minded (see the non-negligeable numbers of conflict in Table IV.2) and do more
likely reject in the largest pie period. According to the positive and significant
parameter α5 they later on are more inclined to accept. Ultimatum power helps
to reach an agreement (α3 > 0, p− level = .0000) confirming Observation 6 . Over
time, the probability of acceptance decreases significantly, i.e. responders learn
to reject.
8Our regression takes 3193 observations into account instead of the 5040 theoretical ones due
to agreements in earlier periods (for t < 2 and t < 3).
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B S.E. t− ratio p− value
Constant α0 −1.5740 .431 −3.649 .0003
PMaxit α1 −.0230 .015 −1.425 .1542
PMaxit .T
Max
it α01 −.1214 .014 −8.627 .0000
Oit α2 .1361 .018 7.481 .0000
Oit.T
Max
it α02 .4082 .036 11.202 .0000
T ermi,t α3 .2745 .067 4.058 .0000
Rit α4 −.0133 .004 −3.057 .0022
Rit.T
Max
it α04 .0094 .005 1.859 .0630
Afterit α5 1.792 .160 11.178 .0000
LogL = −922.2676 p− level = .0000
χ2 = 2563.695 N (9) = 3193
Table V. 2: Estimation results of Probit Regression Model.
6. Discussion and conclusions
In typical experiments of alternating offer bargaining participants are confronted
with just one pie-development and (except for Güth, Ockenfels and Wendel, 1993)
with ultimatum power only in the last period t = T . Compared to this our
participants faced 4 very different types of pie-dynamics as well as early (t ≤ T )
and only late (t = T ) ultimatum power. By exploring the broader spectrum of
institutions/rules we could demonstrate that participants
• are motivated by efficiency considerations, i.e. aim at reaching an agreement
when the pie is largest, and
• use unfair offers mainly as a signal that an agreement should be reached
when the pie is largest,
• are reluctant to exploit ultimatum power regardless when it is available.
Compared to other studies of robust learning (see Güth, 2000) this leaves little or
no room for learning. This suggests the more general conclusion that learning, i.e.
9cf. note 2.
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shadow of the past, is negligible when strong norms like efficiency and equality
concerns provide strong guidance how to negotiate.
Forward looking deliberation seems to be decisive. The main intentions, namely
to share the maximal pie and to propose a rather fair distribution, reveal carefully
deliberated plans and thus a much stronger shadow of the future than of the past.
The results for the games Iy and Hy nevertheless reveal that normative game
theory, which is purely forward looking, does not explain experimentally observed
behavior (compare the predictions in Table II.2 with the results in Table IV.4).
The forward looking considerations of the participants are rather norm oriented
than strategic: Behavior is shaped by fairness and efficiency concerns and not by
opportunistic rationality.
It would, however, be premature to generalize our conclusions beyond the scope
of distribution conflicts in small groups like dyads. Other situations, e.g. large
anonymous markets, might trigger more egoistic motives and lead to outcomes
which are more in line with opportunistic rationality. Although each robust learn-
ing experiment like ours covers already a variety of structurally different institu-
tions, one should perform similar studies for other types of decision problems (see
the studies reviewed in Güth, 2000).
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Appendix A: Instructions:
In the experiment you will interact anonymously in groups of two participants. Each
partcipant gets 5 DM show up fee. You will not be informed about the other’s identity
nor will your partner be informed about yours. You and your partner constitute a group
of two persons named A and B. What A and B can share is an amount of points, p (20
points = 1 DM), whose value depends on when you and you partner reach an agreement.
The interaction is organized as follows:
1. In the first period, t = 1, Partner A chooses an offer O1 to Partner B. If Partner
B accepts the offer, A earns p1 − O1 and B earns O1. If not, they go to the second
period t = 2.
2. In the second period, t = 2, Partner B chooses an offer O2 to Partner A. If Partner
A accepts the offer, B earns p2−O2 and A earns O2. If not, they go to the third period
t = 3.
3. In the third period, t = 3, Partner A chooses an offer O3 to Partner B. If Partner
B accepts the offer, A earns p3 −O3 and B earns O3. If not, both earn 0.
The values p1, p2 and p3 depend on the situation D, I, H or V :
p1 p2 p3 Situation
30 20 10 D
10 20 30 I
10 25 10 H
25 10 25 V
In addition, you might have a Termination Option.
Termination Option : If one partner chooses the termination option in period t < 3,
the interaction process ends with this offer, i.e. the other cannot make a counteroffer.
Partner A can choose the Termination Option in t = 1, and partner B in t = 2. If
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A chooses the termination option, partner B can’t choose it in the next period as the
interaction stops in period t = 1 regardless whether B accepts or not.
You will be 4 times in situation D (twice without and twice with the Termination
Option), then 4 times in situation I (twice without and twice with the Termination
Option), then 4 times in situation H (twice without and twice with the Termination
Option), 4 times in situation V (twice without and twice with the Termination Option).
The whole session consists of 3 sequences of such 16 rounds, i.e. of altogether 48 rounds.
At the beginning of each round, we form randomly new groups of two participants with
one A and one B participant.
After each round you will be informed about your own earning. Payments will be made
privately at the end of the session. Please, raise your hand if you have any question.
We will try to answer them privately. Thank you for your cooperation!
Appendix B: Questionnaire
Please, fill out this questionnaire completely. To check your understanding of the in-
structions we kindly ask you to answer the following questions. Suppose the following
arbitrarily specified decisions:
2. In period t = 2, the offer equals O2 = 5 and A accepts it.
How much does A and B participants earn?
A earns
In situation D,
B earns
A earns
In situation I ,
B earns
A earns
In situation H,
B earns
A earns
In situation V ,
B earns
3. Imagine that partner A chooses the termination option in period t = 1.
Can Partner B make a counteroffer in period t = 2 ?
Yes
No
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